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Andrew Fletcher, England, Europe and the Search for a New British Polity  
Richard Finlay, University of Strathclyde 
 
The purpose of this paper is to locate the actions and activities of Andrew Fletcher in a 
wider British and European context as this is essential to understanding the main thrust of 
his intellectual assault on the incorporating Union of 1707.  Other scholars have already 
drawn attention to Fletcher's ideas within the European tradition of political thought and 
his role in the machinations of the Scottish parliamentary sessions leading up to 1707.i  
What has arguably received less attention, particularly in a Scottish context,  is that the 
period from the Revolutions of 1688 and 1690 leading up to the Union was set against the 
wider backdrop of the future of Europe.ii In particular, foreign policy and international 
relations were determined by the question of the dominance of Louis XIV and the belief 
that he sought to establish a 'universal monarchy' that would create a French hegemony in 
the known world. As Steve Pincus notes, this was a Europe polarized between the 
ambitions of the French absolutist and bureaucratic regime and the Dutch and English led 
alliance that sought to protect 'the national integrity of each and every European state.'iii 
It was not, as has often been claimed, a fundamental division between Protestants and 
Catholics that engulfed Europe, as the British and Dutch alliance with Catholic Spain, the 
Hapsburg Empire and various southern European principalities and kingdoms illustrate. 
That said, however, is not to deny the importance of religion as a motivation for many 
people.iv Put plainly, domestic bigotry in both Scotland and England did not impact on 
the conduct of foreign policy.  Indeed, staunch supporter of the Revolution settlement as 
he was, Fletcher was not a Protestant bigot as his many writings testify.v Nor was it 
necessarily a competition between a forward-looking constitutional model that paved the 
way for parliamentary democracy as many Whig historians have argued, versus that of a 
backward-looking and anachronistic model of absolutism.vi Indeed, both were designed 
to create modern powerful states and the success of Louis' France meant that it was the 
ideal model for James VII to emulate in order to achieve his ambitions of  establishing 
absolutism and building a first rate European power.vii The war of Spanish Succession 
(1702-1713) that followed on from the Nine Years war (1688-97) had the same raison 
d'etre: containing the territorial ambition of Louis, which in 1702 had the added 
frightening prospect of the Bourbon House of France inheriting the Hapsburg throne of 
Spain and all its dominions to create a Catholic imperial superpower. Yet, as Allan 
Macinnes has pointed out, the war for the Spanish succession was also a war for the 
British succession because had Louis won, he would have restored the Stuarts.viii 
     It was in this highly charged and uncertain European political environment that 
Fletcher sought to reformulate a new British polity. Nationalist as he was, there is no 
question that Fletcher did not envisage some form of cooperation with England as this 
was essential to safeguard the Revolution Settlement and there is no doubt that victory for 
Louis would dismantle this.ix At this point, some explanation is required as to what is 
PHDQWE\µ%ULWLVKSROLW\¶$OWKRXJKOHJDOO\VHSDUDWe kingdoms, a British polity had come 
into effect, if not before, with the Union of the Crowns.x Given the constitutional balance 
of power at that time and the centrality of monarchy to government, the one king who 
had three kingdoms effectively guaranteed a degree of coherence. Indeed, under the later 
Stuarts, it was an advantage to their absolutist tendencies to have three separate 
governPHQWV DV -DPHV¶V HIIHFWLYH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI DEVROXWLVP LQ ,UHODQG DQG 6FRWODQG
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though not in England,  demonstrated.xi   Following the revolutions in Scotland and 
England, however, the constitutional balance of power shifted to the parliaments in 
Scotland and England at the expense of the monarchy and effectively undermined the key 
aspect that maintained the internal coherence of a British polity. Although this process 
ZDV QRW UHDGLO\ DSSDUHQW WR PRVW FRQWHPSRUDULHV )OHWFKHU¶V FULWLFLVPRI WKH QHJOHFW RI
Scottish interests under the Union of the Crowns was not just an indictment of past 
failures, but was a recognition that with more powerful parliaments in both Scotland and 
England to safeguard national interests some form of new accommodation would have to 
be reached.  Put simply, the abuses of the past were no longer sustainable in the 
post-revolutionary era.  
     What will be argued below is that firstly, the growth of nationalism, meaning the 
articulation of a national interest, was not only a Scottish phenomenon of this period, but 
was widespread throughout Europe and was particularly pronounced in England.xii As 
PXFKDVDQ\WKLQJ)OHWFKHU¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRID6FRWWLVKQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWZDVDUHDFWLRQWR
the growth of an increasingly expressive and aggressive English national interest. While 
the Scottish political backdrop to the Union has been studied intensively, little attention 
has focussed on English politics and strategy.xiii The obvious questions are why did the 
English want a Union and what did they hope it would achieve? At the time, English 
politics was absorbed by the war of the Spanish Succession and competing visions of 
how it should be fought. It was riven by bitter animosity between Whigs and Tories in 
what Queen Anne calleGWKHµUDJHRISDUW\¶DQGZDVUHQGHUHGXQVWDEOHE\WKHLPSDFWRI
the Triennial Act that imposed elections every three years.xiv The growth of English 
nationalism and the party political machinations of the English parliament are central to 
IUDPLQJ)OHWFKHU
VDQGRWKHU6FRWWLVKSROLWLFLDQV¶UHVSRQVHWRWKH8QLRQGHEDWH$VHFRQG
related issue is that of the suitability of the incorporating union as a feasible and sensible 
option in the creation of a new British polity. In many respects, when it comes to the 
reformulation of a British polity we know more about what Fletcher did not want than 
ZKDWKHGLG ,QGHHGPXFKRI)OHWFKHU¶VKLVWRULFDO OHJDF\ LVVKDSHGE\Kis negativity to 
WKH8QLRQVRPXFKVRWKDWKHKDVDFTXLUHGWKHVREULTXHWµWKH3DWULRW¶IRUKLVXQEHQGLQJ
opposition. Yet, the issue to be explored is  how much of that opposition was 
conditioned by the poor quality of English thought, judgement and care in refashioning 
Anglo-Scottish relations? For Fletcher, an incorporating Union would not only betray the 
principles of the Scottish Revolution, but it would undermine the principles of the 
(QJOLVK5HYROXWLRQDVLWZRXOGHQKDQFHWKH&RXUW¶VDXWKRULW\LQ6FRWland. After all, was 
this not similar to the policies pursued by James VII where the parliamentary process was 
circumvented first in the lesser kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland?xv Finally, the English 
absorption of Scotland was totally at odds with the objectives of the Grand Alliance 
against Louis XIV. Indeed, in an almost throwaway remark in 1701 Fletcher pondered 
the possibility of William as absolute monarch of the United Provinces and Britain and 
hinted that such a scenario was more likely to create a universal monarchy than the 
ambitions of Louis.xvi $OO RI ZKLFK WDNHV XV WR RXU WKLUG SRLQW DQG )OHWFKHU¶s goal to 
protect not just the revolution from dangers without, but also from dangers within. In a 
sense, he put his finger on the paradox of the Revolution Settlement; safeguarding the 
Revolution from external enemies required the creation of a strong state, but a strong 
state created the ideal climate for the growth of the power of the prince who would 
inevitably use such powers to enhance his authority and undo the principles of the 
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Revolution.xvii We see this not only in his growing disillusionment with William, but also 
in his growing quasi-republican sentiments in the first decade of the eighteenth century. 
For Fletcher, power had to be devolved to prevent the growth of authoritarianism. In this 
sense, Fletcher was remarkably prescient in warning of the dangers of the authority of the 
Fiscal Military State and indeed, during the course of the eighteenth century, much of the 
achievement of the Revolution in England was dismantled. As Geoffrey Homes reminds 
us, the franchise in Britain after the Great Reform Act in 1832 was actually slightly more 
restrictive than it was in 1700. xviii 
 
Nationalism 
 
In English history, nationalism is the ideology that dare not speak its name.xix Indeed, in 
assessing Scottish accounts of the Union of 1707, one would be tempted to conclude that 
the Union was the English reaction to the growth of Scottish nationalism as formulated in 
the Act of Security and the Act anent War and Peace in which the Scots would not agree 
to the same line of succession as England unless guarantees were first given to Scotland 
and the right to declare war was to be taken from the monarch and reserved to the 
Scottish parliament. The issue of the succession was brought about by the passing by the 
(QJOLVKSDUOLDPHQW LQRI WKH$FWRI6HWWOHPHQW IROORZLQJ WKHGHDWKRI$QQH¶V ODVW
surviving child, the duke of Gloucester. As the heir apparent was unlikely to produce any 
successor, the English parliament, without consulting its Scottish counterpart, decided 
that the succession would continue in the Hanoverian line of the family.xx Needless to 
say, the Scots took umbrage at not being consulted. Yet, this is only part of the story. 
While the Act of Settlement is lauded in English historiography for the limitations it put 
on the future monarch and is deemed to mark to growth of parliamentary sovereignty, 
less attention has focussed on its nationalist dimension.xxi Although the term nationalism 
is problematic when discussing the early modern era and it should not be conflated with it 
modern ideological variant, the fact remains  that the term is appropriate if it is used in 
relation to the articulation of a clear sense of national interests.xxii The Act of Settlement 
emerged as a result of Tory discontent that much English blood and treasure had been 
H[SHQGHGRQSXUVXLQJDIRUHLJQSROLF\WRSURWHFW:LOOLDP¶V8QLWHG3URYLQFHV,QIXWXUH
ZDU DQG SHDFH ZRXOG EH WDNHQ RXW RI WKH .LQJ¶V KDQGV DQG SODFHG LQ SDUOLDPHQW 1RU
wRXOGKHEHDEOHWRWUDYHODEURDGZLWKRXW3DUOLDPHQW¶VDSSURYDO:LOOLDPZDVXQSRSXODU
on account of the rewards and promotions of his Dutch favourites such as Bentinck and 
Portland and in future, the Privy Council would be confined to those born in the British 
Isles. William was a Calvinist who was deemed to be apathetic to the interest of the 
Church of England and in future  the monarch would have to be a practicing Anglican. 
In short, the limitations on the English monarchy were imposed precisely to safeguard an 
English national interest that would be maintained in future by Parliament. The Act of 
Settlement was a nationalist document in that it was produced in response to the 
experience of having a Dutch King with the future prospect of a German one.xxiii  
     When Queen Anne ascended to the English throne, she told the English Parliament 
that 'I know mine own heart to be entirely English.'xxiv This met with approval, unlike her 
exhortation to create a Union with Scotland which was passed over in silence in the 
RIILFLDO UHVSRQVH WR WKHPRQDUFK¶V VSHHFK WRSDUOLDPHQW$OWKRXJK(QJOLVKSROLWLFVZDV
HQJXOIHGE\WKHµUDJHRISDUWLHV¶ERWK7RULHVDQG:KLJVFOHDUO\DUWLFXODWHG a vision of an 
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English national interest. For Tories, this was a defence of the prerogatives and privileges 
of the Church of England, a championing of the gentry and the power of the land, 
especially denouncing the land tax as a means of funding the war, and the pursuit of a 
EOXHZDWHUVWUDWHJ\WKDWIRFXVVHGRQHPSLUHUDWKHUWKDQWKH:KLJV¶SROLF\RIFRQWLQHQWDO
intervention on the European mainland. Although Fletcher was clearly Whig, he did 
favour the blue water strategy largely on account of the fact that the navy could not pose 
as great a threat to internal liberty limited as it was to the sea and coast, unlike the army 
which could be deployed at home.xxv Whigs maintained that religious pluralism was 
more in line with national character, that war in the continent was necessary to safeguard 
English national interests and that future prosperity would be found not in land, but in 
manufacturing, trade and the City. While Fletcher broadly fits into this camp, he 
remained suspicious of the power of  London to suck the economic life blood out of the 
surrounding environment and the corrupting influences of wealth and luxury brought 
about by trade.xxvi Also, like most Tories, he had great faith in the economic potential of 
land and agriculture.xxvii Underlying these opposing Whig and Tory views were opinions 
on the Revolution. At the one extreme were some Tories who believed that the 
Revolution replaced a bad king with a good one and that was that. At the other end of the 
spectrum were the Whigs who believed that the Revolution had ushered in profound 
political and constitutional change that had eradicated the previous system lock stock and 
barrel.xxviii Needless to say, the majority of views hovered between these two points and 
was complicated further by the fact that some such as Sunderland could change their 
views radically without a second thought and others such as Robert Harley who started 
out as a Whig but became more and more Tory.xxix English nationalism can be seen in 
Bills against Occasional Conformity designed to keep non-conformists out of official 
positions, Bills against immigrants and Jews and in the ways in which both Whigs and 
Tories chose to present Scotland as either full of Republican, non-conformist Whigs or 
Die-Hard Jacobite absolutists.xxx In short Scotland was a useful metaphor to portray the 
worse excess of the opposition. 
      The tendency of historians to view the Scottish and English parliaments in isolation 
has obscured the ways in which they influenced one another. It can be said that the Union 
came about because the Court had lost control of the Scottish parliament, but it must also 
be remembered that the Court had difficulty in controlling the English parliament. 
Domestic political instability was a hall-mark of both nations at the time. For example, 
the WHFKQLTXH RI ¶WDFNLQJ¶ ZKHUHE\ D SUREOHPDWLF SLHFH RI OHJLVODWLRQ WKDW PLJKW QRW
secure the approval of the House of Lords or the Queen was  added on to legislation for 
Supply - the preserve of the House of Commons only - was used in England to try and get 
the controversial Occasional Conformity Bill through in 1702, though thrown out by the 
Lords.xxxi This technique was used to greater effect in Scotland where the Act of Security 
ZDVµWDFNHG¶ to the Bill of Supply which meant that with no upper chamber to reject it, it 
had to go through. In England this caused consternation, with the Lord Chancellor, 
Godolphin, coming under Whig attack for not urging the Queen to use her prerogative to 
veto it.xxxii This placed the Whigs in an invidious position in that as the constitutional 
party in favour of the Rights of 1688, they were calling on the government to use royal 
prerogative against a piece of legislation passed legitimately by a free parliament. For 
Godolphin, it was a way to demonstrate the effects of what would happen if the Whigs 
had their way and created a form of government that  limited royal authority. 
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Unexpectedly bounced by this, the Whigs then pushed the Alien Act which many 
believed illegal and by all accounts, was a clumsy endeavour that created so much bad 
blood in Scotland that it seemed that it would push Anglo Scottish rapprochement further 
back.xxxiii The Whigs that stood for constitutional liberty and the rights of the individual 
under the law ended up pushing a piece of legislation that discriminated against some of 
the monarchs subjects. Whig consciences could be assuaged to some extent by the fact 
that they clearly believed that the hanging of the crew of the Worcester clearly broke a 
common understanding of Anglo-Scottish legal harmony. xxxiv   The lengthy and 
protracted debates on the Union in the Scottish parliament, made English political 
managers come to the conclusion that there should be no debate and only a vote in the 
English Parliament to stop the opposition using stalling tactics. This caused a number of 
Tories to withdraw from the house in opposition and the Union was passed by 274 to 116 
(211 to 105 and 274 to 160 in other accounts).xxxv Sir John Packington said he was 
against it because 'it was like marrying a women against her consent: An Union that was 
carried on by corruption and bribery indoors and by force and violence without'.xxxvi In 
the House  of Lords about twenty five members consistently put opposition in its way 
and fourteen formally protested against it. The Earl of Nottingham objected to the name 
of Great Britain which he claimed 'subverted all the laws of England' and the Bishop of 
Bath and Wells claimed the Union was 'mixing strong liquors of contrary nature in one 
and the same vessel, which would go nigh being burst asunder by furious 
fermentation'.xxxvii  It is worth remembering that the English vote took place in February 
when attendance was normally low and that the Court had about one hundred compliant 
members of the House of Commons that were usually loyal. Furthermore, there appears 
to have been considerable effort to mobilize parliamentary support. It is not the case that 
the Union was carried in the English parliaments with great enthusiasm and indeed, there 
was a persistent, if minority, opposition.. A further point can be made. The proposals in 
the Scottish parliament to move to elections every three years and extend the Burgh 
franchise were designed to emulate the English parliament and consolidate the 
Revolution. If successfully passed, had these reforms come into effect (they were 
cancelled out by the Union), then it would have been more difficult for the Court to 
control the Scottish parliament as management and patronage would have to be reasserted 
every three years.xxxviii  Furthermore, Fletcher was probably uneasy at the way in which 
English politics was moving. Whereas the Scottish parliament had given the Court a 
bloody nose and was intent on pushing through reform, the English parliament was 
becoming more conservative, better managed by Court and the intellectual debate was 
moving away from revolution principles, particularly after the accession of Anne. The 
growth of a strong Anglican sentiment, the belief in non-resistance and passive 
obedience, together with a strengthening cult surrounding the martyrdom of Charles I and 
more conservative interpretations of 1688, all would be an anathema to Fletcher's Whig 
principles.xxxix   
     As an astute observer of English politics,xl the promotion of an English national 
interest did not go unnoticed by Fletcher and in many ways, both the Act of Security, the 
Act anent War and Peace and the Limitations proposed on the power of the crown were 
simply  a Scottish reflection of what had already happened in England.  Whereas the 
English parliament took out safeguards on the prospect of being ruled by a foreign prince, 
the  Scottish parliament, of which Fletcher was a leading instigator, merely took out 
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safeguards against the prospect of being ruled by a King of England. Just as in England, 
the national interest would be left to parliament to decide. The obvious point to stress 
here is that there was no coherent articulation of a British national interest coming from 
south of the border that took Scottish interests into consideration. This can be 
demonstrated by the perennial stumbling block of open trade between two allies at war 
under the same monarch in which the English insisted that the Scots be treated as 
foreigners and subject to restrictions. The absurdity of this can be illustrated by imagining 
what would have happened to Anglo-American relations during the Second World War if 
the British had insisted that the Americans pay tariffs on lease-lend. It might be 
contended that open trade between the two nations was the ace up the sleeve in bringing 
about Union.xli Yet, there was no enthusiasm in England for Union until late in the day.xlii 
Rather, what it clearly illustrates is the overwhelming priority given to a key national 
interest at the expense of relations with an ally. While English and Dutch opposition to 
Darien has often been explained in terms of the diplomatic upset this would cause to 
Spain, as Fletcher pointed out, the Company of ScotlaQG¶V H[HPSWLRQ IURP WD[HV IRU
twenty-one years was a lucrative proposition to English traders, and this explains why it 
so popular initially among London traders, until William clamped down on it. xliii  
Crucially it could have provided a northern tax haven that would have denuded the 
English state of much needed revenue to pay for its mounting national debt.xliv English 
commercial relations with Ireland, likewise reveal a ruthless national interest at work in 
which Irish goods were subject to tariffs on the demand of English merchants.xlv The 
Treaty of Utrecht which brought the War of Spanish Succession to and end, likewise 
witnessed allies sold out to promote commercial interests.xlvi Finally, one of the key 
stipulations of the Union was that the Company of Scotland be wound up to remove any 
potential trading rivals.xlvii  So far from the Union being an English response to the 
growth of Scottish nationalism, the trigger was in fact the opposite, as Scots, led in the 
PDLQE\)OHWFKHU¶VSHQHWUDWLQJDQDO\VLVEHOLHYHGWKHLUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWZDVLQGDQJHURI
being rode over roughshod by an English Court party determined to pursue its own 
national interest at all costs. For Fletcher, any future British polity had to have safeguards 
to protect the Scottish national interest which had been eroded since 1603. As things 
stood, he claimed, the constitutional position of the Court in Scottish politics was simply 
the English Ministry writ large.xlviii 
     As John Robertson has noted Fletcher was well aware that the existence of small 
kingdoms depended on the development of the European state system and were in danger 
of being swallowed up. In a casual remark in the Discourse Concerning the Affairs of 
Spain  KH EOLWKHO\ ZULWHV WKDW VKRXOG WKH 6SDQLDUGV PRYH WKHLU FRXUW WR /LVERQ µWKH
Portuguese will then be content to give up their own language and customs, and with 
WKHPHYHU\PHPRU\RIEHLQJDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\RUJRYHUQPHQW¶xlix  Written before 
Union was a serious proposition, it indicates that Fletcher was well aware of what the 
potential consequences for Scotland could be when faced with a determined expansionist 
English state. Indeed, the central thrust of his criticism of the state of affairs under the 
Union of the Crowns was that Scottish sovereignty had been eroded and that the solution 
ZDVIRULWVUHDVVHUWLRQ$VZHVKDOOVHHRQHRI)OHWFKHU¶VSHUVLVWHQWFULWLFLVPVZDVWKDWWKe 
6FRWWLVK5HYROXWLRQ6HWWOHPHQWZDVQRWDGHTXDWHO\UHFRJQLVHGLQ(QJODQGDQGWKDWµ7KLV
kingdom must need be looked upon by the English to be in a state of vassalage and 
dependency'. l Not withstanding the great indignities he complains of,  he said he was 
 Fletcher of Saltoun Lecture to The Scottish parliament 6th September 2012 
IRU DQ 
KRQRXUDEOH 7UHDW\ ZLWK (QJODQG¶ )RU )OHWFKHU WKDW PHDQW EHLQJ WUHDWHG DV D
sovereign equal and explains his constant endeavours to have the parliament appoint 
formal ambassadors and maintain other trappings of national sovereignty, including 
diplomatic status for the Scottish Commissioners appointed to negotiate the Union.li 
 
Incorporating Union as a Solution to the British Polity 
 
Undoubtedly for Fletcher, incorporating Union was a bad idea per se. As a political loner, 
he was largely by-passed in the machinations of the various political factions in the 
Scottish parliament and Fletcher had only an imperfect grasp of the political realities of 
the workings of Scottish politics at the time. His conviction that an incorporating union 
was such a bad idea blinded him to the possibility that backdoor manoeuvring by the 
Court Party would outweigh the cut and thrust of intellectual argument on the floor of 
parliament. His naivety as to the realities of the union's growing momentum is captured 
in a letter written by the brother of the Earl of Mar: 
 
He believes [Fletcher] that the nation is so generally averse to it that it will not 
stand out one seredunt in the parliament and that the promoters of it will think 
themselves happy if they can get it quickly smothered but that he and those against 
it will endeavour to bring it in and have it debated that they may oppose it for ever. 
he thinks too, that it will not carry in the English parliament tho it should be ratified 
in ours ... Salton is altogether singular in believing that it will meet with so very 
few friend in our parliament.lii 
 
The conventional approach to understanding the reasons why the Scottish 
parliamentarians acquiesced in the process of  incorporating union with England 
involves explaining, in the main, the shift from opposition to support by the New Party or 
Squadrone Volante and a few others, as this gave the Court the necessary numbers to 
command a majority in the Scottish parliament. The explanation why opinion shifted 
from opposition to support tends to turn on interpretations revolving around base 
self-interest through management and corruption or pragmatisms and points of political 
principle.  Arguably, the intensity of debate surrounding the motivation of Scottish 
politicians has obfuscated two fundamental issues. Firstly, was incorporating union a 
sensible and realistic solution to the difficulties of a British polity in this period?  
Fletcher believed it was not. Secondly, what was the motivation of English politicians? 
After all, it takes two to tango. An introspective obsession with ascribing particular 
motivations  to Scottish politicians will only illuminate half the issue. Without English 
acquiescence there could be no union. 
     The reasons given  for the English pursuit of the Union were to secure both the 
Northern border and the Hanoverian succession at a time of war in Europe. Undoubtedly 
Fletcher had probably calculated that in the middle of a conflagration, English politicians 
may have been more amenable to accept demands for a reassertion of Scottish 
sovereignty and that a bargain could be struck.liii  After all, logic would seem to dictate 
that from a strategic perspective, the last thing that was needed was to create a crisis on 
the northern border. Yet, this is precisely what English strategy did. All of which begs 
some fundamental questions. If English strategy was designed to secure both the northern 
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border and the Hanoverian succession; was a policy of Incorporating Union the safest and 
most secure strategy to pursue? Although the Scottish parliament had become 
unmanageable and was forcefully reasserting its independence; did this actually 
constitute a major threat to English interests? In reality, Scottish politics had become 
sunk in a quagmire with the various factions unable to establish a clear position of 
authority. It is also the case that the issue of Supply was in danger of being held up and 
that payment for the Scottish military contribution would not be forthcoming. In many 
respects, Scottish government was in danger of grinding to a halt. But was this a threat? 
The Scottish Supply was paltry compared to the subsidies that England was paying to 
European allies, so it was no great loss.liv There was no immediate prospect of Queen 
Anne dying, so the issue of the Succession was not critical. With a baldly functioning 
government, what possible threat could the Scots pose to the Northern border when the 
prospect was that they were too busy fighting among themselves to bother with anyone 
else? 
    Yet, by forcing the issue of Union, the danger for the English is that they would in 
fact galvanize an opposition into existence. Union was the one thing that would bring 
Whigs and Jacobites together and indeed, English spies, of which there were a great 
many, reported back that the prospect of the Union was in fact making Scotland more 
unstable and increasing hostility to England. As one report to Robert Harley, the English 
Northern Secretary, claimed in 1705:  
 
on the conclusion of the Union was a proper time for the King of France to send 
some troops with some money and ammunition and some arms and some officers; 
and if the Prince of Wales should come himself the most of the Kingdom would 
join him withal.lv  
 
Nor did things get any better when the prospect of  Union become more likely: 
 
the Jacobites have some designs in their heads this Summer for they have been very 
busy in caballing and plotting all this Spring ... They laugh at anything of an Union 
and to divert that business they have a story that the King of France will give 
Scotland far better terms than ever they can expect from England, that Scotland 
may have freedom and liberty of trade to all the French and Spanish plantations 
abroad ... for since I can remember I never saw the Jacobites in such heart.lvi    
 
Any impartial reading of English intelligence reports on Scotland and the prospect on 
Union highlight its unpopularity and its ability to galvanize and rouse the crowd. They 
also reveal considerable doubts about its prospect of success in the face of such 
overwhelming opposition.  When Fletcher wrote that 'I consider that it a state of 
separation from England, my country would be perpetually involved in bloody and 
destructive wars', it is somewhat paradoxical that a policy of incorporating Union was 
fairly likely to achieve that outcome. If we forget about the eventual outcome and 
hindsight, English policy towards Scotland was risky and highly dangerous and had the 
potential to do more damage to English national interests than fix any real problems.  
    That it was a reckless policy can be seen by the fact that the prospect of an Anglo 
Scottish war reared its ugly head. It is well documented that troop movements were in 
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place to effect a military solution should that be necessary, though Chris Whatley has 
cautioned against reading too much into this. lvii  Certainly the threat was there. 
Furthermore, Scottish politicians were acquiescent in these developments. Roxburgh 
EHOLHYHG WKDW (QJOLVK WURRSV µDUH WKH RQO\ VHFXULW\ , NQRZ¶ lviii and  none were more 
explicit than the Earl of Stair writing to Robert Harley in November 1706: 
 
I acknowledge there is great ground to believe the opposers are so bold and resolute 
that they will spare no means to obstruct the ratification of the Treaty, and will take 
off foully some persons that may be most forward, or else raise the country in arms, 
towards which there are too many open steps made already... I could wish to hear 
of your troops in the North of England and Ireland, for it encourages our enemies to 
think that you have none near. .. It is easier to stifle ill inclinations than to reduce 
open rebellion upon popular sentiments, therefore, I long to hear of the troops; and 
upon the arrival of the Duke of Marlborough I doubt not they are ordered to march. 
For the first effect of the country's rising would be to chase us home, and the 
baulking of the Union at this time may be an irreparable loss to this nation, and to 
the liberty of Europe and our religion.lix 
 
Yet, a military intervention in Scotland at a time of war on the continent would have 
meant diverting forces away from crucial theatres of operations. The Duke of 
Marlborough was especially unhappy about the prospect that troops had to be diverted 
from Flanders to Spain in 1707.lx  Particularly at this time when there was a stalemate 
and every soldier counted. It would have handed a major propaganda victory to Louis by 
demonstrating that his principle enemy was unable to keep order in his own backyard. Of 
necessity it would have meant the deployment of foreign mercenaries on British soil, 
which was bound to be unpopular. It would raise the spectre of civil war. It could have 
split the Protestant minority in Ireland as Irish Presbyterians took side with their Scottish 
coreligionists. The Anglican dominated Irish parliament had stated quite categorically: 
 
And in case any difference shall arise between England and Scotland, we will most 
firmly adhere to the Imperial Crown of England in maintaining the succession in 
the protestant line as the same as settled by the late Acts of parliament made in 
(QJODQG DJDLQVW DOO SHUVRQV ZKR VKDOO DWWHPSW WR GLVHQWDQJOH \RXU 0DMHVW\¶V
Kingdoms or to receive any other successors in any of them.lxi 
 
Irrespective of the final military outcome, the fact that armed intervention was necessary 
would have been seen as a colossal political failure. Why then embark on such a risky 
venture? 
    Part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that there was no coherent English 
policy towards Scotland; it was largely improvised on the hoof. The one thing that both 
nationalist and unionists readings of the Union share is that Scotland mattered, and this 
assumption has arguably blinded us to what was in reality a quite haphazard 
accommodation between one interested party (Scotland) and one that was, to put it 
mildly, indifferent (England). Certainly there is no real evidence that the English 
conducted what today we would call a risk assessment. As has already been mentioned, 
the 'rage of party' and the difficulty of conducting war pushed Scotland down the political 
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agenda to such an extent that it was not given much attention or serious thought. As J. D. 
C. Clark has noted, 'contingency' has been underestimated in accounts of eighteenth 
century political development as historians have been overly keen to ascribe ideological 
imperatives to political actions, when in actual fact more mundane features such as 
expediency, party political advantage and opportunity dictated events. lxii  It does not 
necessarily follow that great events in history spring from great causes. Although it can 
not be stated with absolute certainty, a major factor why the issue of Union loomed large, 
but had little to do directly with Scotland, was that it was an unintended  by product of 
the English 'rage of party' which used the issue of Succession as a club to beat the 
opposition. English Whigs mercilessly used the question of Hanoverian loyalty to cause 
maximum discomfort to Tory opponents as can be seen in 1702 when the voluntary oath 
of abjuration of the 'Pretended Prince of Wales' caused serious misgivings among Tories 
in the House of Lords.lxiii The number of Tory abstentions was gleefully totted up to tar 
the party with Jacobitism. Meanwhile, Tories could shamefacedly call for the Duke of 
Cambridge (the future George II) to take his seat in the House of Lords following his 
naturalization in 1705, knowing full well that Queen Anne was resolutely opposed to a 
Hanoverian residence in London during her lifetime.lxiv All of which cast a shadow of 
ambiguity on the Queen's commitment to Hanover. As the issue of the Succession was 
used as a political football in England, it is not surprising that the fact that the Scots had 
not yet settled the issue should remain in the spotlight.  After all, both Whigs and Tories 
could mine the issue for political capital. Even a cursory glance at the political 
correspondence of English ministers reveals that Scotland was a problem, but not seen as 
a crisis, and as such received little detailed attention. Often, Scotland appears simply as 
an afterthought or addendum to more pressing matters of state.  
     As P.W.J. Riley noted, English domestic politics were the primary reason for the 
Union gathering momentum in 1705 as Whigs sought to use the issue of the Scottish Act 
of Security to bring pressure to bear on Godolphin for his handling of the succession.lxv 
The Whigs had been traditionally opposed to the idea of a Union on the grounds that 
Scottish MPs and Lords would be more susceptible to Court influence. Whereas 
Godolphin and Marlborough were quite happy to let the issue rumble on, the Whigs 
sought to embarrass the Court and by pushing the Alien Act brought the issue back into 
the spotlight. It was also a way to increase their influence during any Anglo- Scottish 
negotiations. Godolphin eager to deflect attention away from the issue, acquiesced in the 
decision to open talks with the Scots. There is a danger, however, of viewing the 
Anglo-Scottish problem in isolation from the wider English political picture because it 
WHQGVWRPDJQLI\WKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHLVVXH:KLOH6HFUHWDU\9HUQRQ¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQFH
to his political master Lord Shrewsbury does report quite extensively on the Scottish 
LVVXH6KUHZVEXU\¶VRZQFRUUHVSRQGHQFHKDUGO\FRYHUVLWDWDOOlxvi In the wider political 
picture, the Scottish problem was simply one of many and by placing it in this context, an 
explanation as to the motivation of English politicians becomes a little clearer. As a 
GHVSRQGHQW /RUG 3HWHUERURXJK WROG WKH +RXVH RI /RUGV µWKH IROly of Portugal, the 
obstinacy of the Emperor, the selfishness of the Dutch and the madness of Scotland all 
VXSHUDGGHGWRWKHSRZHURI)UDQFH¶lxvii In short, the English did not have their problems 
to seek. English strategy and objectives on the Union were made largely incoherent in 
that it was pursued from competing party political priorities which tended to obscure 
wider strategic considerations. Lord Somers, often described as the key architect of the 
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union, told Jonathan Swift that his primary objective was to undo the damage of the 
Scottish Act of Security and nothing more.lxviii 
      )ROORZLQJ 0DUOERURXJK¶V YLFWRU\ DW %OHQKHLP military pressure was relieved, 
although problems remained. Just prior to the news of military success, the Queen had 
given her assent to the Scottish Act of Security. The Whigs were keen to bring pressure 
to bear on the Court to have a greater influence RQZDUVWUDWHJ\DQGWKHµ6FRWFKSUREOHP¶
was an issue likely to pay political dividends. As was mentioned earlier, Godolphin may 
have assumed that the Whigs would find themselves in the invidious position of 
proposing the Queen to use her royal veto as their only possible means of opposition. 
Certainly Godolphin believed that giving royal assent was the best choice available as 
'there may have been more immediate danger in refusing it.'lxix  Furthermore, the Scots 
had given express notice that they would not tolerate its refusal and if it was, this would 
make an agreement on succession less likely.lxx  Whatever Godolphin's motivation, in 
many ways he was in a no win situation, and royal assent of the Scottish Act of Security 
caused a political furore in England, especially as it called for the creation of a Scottish 
Militia which was interpreted as a sign that the Scots were 'tending to defeat the 
Protestant succession and to alienate the two Kingdoms from one another.' lxxi  In all 
probability the issue was one that the Whigs thought they could exploit for political 
capital without endangering the war effort. The Whigs were also careful to play the 
nationalist card by framing the Alien Act as one designed to protect the English national 
interest and although the Bill started out fairly mildly in the House of Lords, it became 
progressively tougher as it made its way through the House of Commons. A point not 
given enough attention in the historiography was the fact that there was an explicit 
recognition of the right of the Scottish parliament to pass the Act and the Whigs played a 
duplicitous game of, on the one hand, arguing for the use of the Veto, but on the other 
making the proposal that one piece of legislation had to be countered by another. As 
6RPHUVSXWLWWKH6FRWVKDGWREHFRXQWHUHGE\µOHJLVODWLYH¶  PHDQV 
 
They were not for telling the Scotch they ought not to pass any act that the House 
should not like, but leaving them to their own freedom and independence, which 
they showed such jealousy of. When they saw anything done that this Kingdom 
ought to be affected with, it seemed more Parliamentary to obviate it in a legislative 
way ... They might show that if the Scotch pretended to set up a separate Kingdom , 
they in all probability would be the greater losers by it.lxxii  
 
Although not noticed at the time, the Alien Act was a de facto recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Scottish parliament. Perhaps Fletcher's proposal to counter the Alien 
Act with Scottish economic sanctions, though meeting with no support, was designed to 
reinforce Scottish legislative authority. 
     The role of Queen Anne was a vital factor. Although she was prepared to live with 
English limitations on the prerogative of the crown, a separate set of Scottish limitations 
from the lesser northern kingdom was deemed to be a hurt to the dignity of Her Majesty. 
As the English Lord Treasurer Godolphin curtly put it to the Scottish Chancellor, 
Seafield: 
 
no body can be surprised when the Parliament will not settle the succession if the 
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Queen refuses her royal assent to any act for a Treaty that will be clogged with 
restrictions and diminutions of that little power which is yet left to the Crown.lxxiii 
 
Although the issue of Anglo-Scottish relations had oscillated around the Succession, it 
was Anne's determined view that the issue was best accomplished by an incorporating 
Union  and as such, gave a clear policy lead to her ministers, whatever their 
reservations.lxxiv Anne's view of the relationship between the Crown and ministers was 
that the latter should behave as personal servants and although the English political 
engagement with Union was lacklustre, that of the Queen was not. The monarch's 
promotion of the issue was essential to build up the necessary momentum and Anne's 
interest is ably testified by the fact that she turned up in person at crucial debates in 
parliament to let her influence carry maximum weight. lxxv Even once the Union was 
safely passed by both parliaments, leading English politicians still had their reservations 
DQGKLQWHGDWWKH4XHHQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHDIIDLU0DUOERURXJKZURWHWR+DUOH\ 
 
I give thanks for your letter and the votes of the House of Commons, by which I 
find they persist in their first thoughts of the matter as I always believed they 
would; but though this be their unanimous sense and the sense of all England; yet if 
it be against the sense of Scotland and contrary to the apprehension of the treaty, I 
doubt it may bring a very great difficulty at this time upon the Queen.lxxvi 
 
The Lord Treasurer Godolphin was hardly cock-a-KRRS DERXW WKH 8QLRQ¶V VXFFHVV µ,
forsee a thousand difficulties and inconveniences during this whole summer, and perhaps 
longer, of making the management of the revenues of that Kingdom but tolerable 
SUDFWLFDO¶lxxvii  
   English ambivalence to the Union was predicated on a number of factors. Firstly, 
although they had a steam of intelligence on Scottish motivation, strategy and intention, 
there was the difficulty of assessing how reliable it was. Throughout the negotiations in 
1706, fears persisted as to how serious the Scots were and if it was not some elaborate 
rouse in which negotiations might fail as had happened in 1703. A leading Whig warned 
WKDW µSHUKDSV WKH $FW IRU D 7UHDW\ LV QRW GHVLJQHG WR VHW D foot a Union, but to affront 
(QJODQG¶lxxviii  $V +DUOH\ DGPLWWHG IUDQNO\ WR 0DUOERURXJK µ, GR QRW XQGHUVWDQG WKDW
FRXQWU\ DQG WKHUHIRUH FDQ QRW WHOO ZKDW ZLOO EH WKH VXFFHVV¶lxxix Suspicions of Scottish 
motives probably encouraged a hard line and the refusal of the English Commissioners to 
discuss anything other than incorporating union made sense. It was the most likely option 
to fail and if this happened, it could easily be blamed on Scottish intransigence, giving 
WKH 0LQLVWU\ D TXLFN H[LW VWUDWHJ\ KDYLQJ GRQH WKH 4XHHQ¶V ELGGLQJ (YHQ ZKHQ WKH
Scottish Commissioners agreed to incorporating union, suspicions still remained. After 
all its unpopularity might bring it down in the Scottish parliament and that was perhaps 
DQLQWHQGHGVWUDWHJ\DVWKH6FRWWLVK&RPPLVVLRQHUVFRXOGFODLPWRKDYHGRQHWKH4XHHQ¶V
bidding. Certainly the Whigs became the most nervous and furiously blamed the Scots 
for leaking information: 
 
The Lord Whigs rail against your Commissioners for having betrayed to the Lord 
Treasurer what passed between them, they suspect most Ormiston. The Lord 
Treasurer owns that he never knew so much of the Whig Lords disposition with 
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respect to himself as he has done since the Treaty.lxxx 
 
The Whigs also rumbled the Jacobite, Lockhart of Carnwarth. English ambivalence was 
encouraged by a second factor; calculating the political consequences of both success and 
failure. The Scots also had difficulty in assessing English motivation and there were 
suspicions that the Union was a party political rouse: 
 
most think here that the English Ministry as little sincere in their design of a Union 
as ever, and some who pretend to be Whigs and know that party well in England 
tell us that the managing Whigs such as Lords Wharton, Somers and Halifax, and 
even Mr Harley, whatever they pretend, are really the greatest enemies to Union, 
and will though indirectly yet effectively obstruct it, because it is by the present 
confusions and difference that they make themselves necessary to a Court that in 
their heart hates them.lxxxi 
 
Reports coming to Scotland indicated that both Godolphin and Harley were not in favour 
of a  union and that it was the Whigs and the Hanoverian representative, Schulz, who 
were most keen.lxxxii In fact, Godolphin was keen and in October 1706 was reasonably 
confident of success: 'Our letters today from Scotland are full of hopes to carry the 
Union. Lord Sunderland is much pleased with the news; and Lord Somers much 
PRUH¶lxxxiii  In many ways, there was no monolithic English position on a union with 
Scotland and both the Whigs and Court made their various calculations regarding both a 
positive and negative outcome. Put simply, both weighed up events in terms of best 
possible party advantage. Whigs believed that Scottish Lords and members of the 
Commons would be more liable to Court control and as such sought to limit their 
numbers. lxxxiv The Scots were only given better terms in numbers of representatives 
because the Court thought it would be to its own advantage. lxxxv Although it was a 
frequent taunt after the union that the Scots could have held out for better conditions, the 
reality was that both the English Court and Whigs were likely to sink the whole venture if 
it was thought that one side or the other was to secure a major party advantage. 
Undoubtedly the acquiescence of the Scottish Commissioners was heightened by the 
need to try and accommodate both English perspectives. 
    As Colin Kidd has remarked, as a project the Union lacked the 'vision thing'. 
Incorporating Union did not have a natural ideological fit with either Whig or Tory.lxxxvi 
It was decidedly at odds with the Tories passionate defence of the Church of England and 
their equally passionate hatred of Presbyterians. The Union would, after all give the 
Scottish Church a legal constitutional position and abandon their Episcopalian brethren 
north of the border.  Nor did it sit comfortably with the Whig notion of a grand alliance 
of liberty in defence of constitutionalism against arbitrary and despotic power. That said, 
the Whigs were traditionally reluctant to tolerate alternative legislative bodies as their 
campaign against the Convocation of the Church of England shows.lxxxvii Also, it must 
not be forgotten that the Scots were unpopular in England. Traditional historical 
prejudice was reinforced by the Act of Security which was widely interpreted as Scottish 
aggression against England, as was the Worcester incident. The latter was widely 
condemned and was not forgotten about.lxxxviii As we shall see, in many ways the Union 
was a bastard child that no one in England, apart from the Queen, really wanted to claim 
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as their own. What both Whigs and Tories shared, however, was a long held tradition in 
the belief of an indivisible sovereignty in government. Culturally, it was difficult to 
accept that following the Revolution, the growth in the powers of the Scottish parliament 
meant that power over the British polity was no longer a monopoly, but would have to be 
shared with the Scots.  This was a political fact of life that English politicians found 
difficult to accept and the progress of the Union demonstrated that English political 
assumptions about Scotland had not changed. It was the one thing that Tory and Whig 
shared. It was as if the Revolution had never happened and more than anything it was this 
failure to recognise that the fundamentals of the British polity had changed after 1690 
that caused Fletcher so much ire. In fairness, it was a political fact of life that many 
Scottish politicians also failed to grasp.  
    A  point that Fletcher made was that too many of the old guard who had served 
under James VII still remained in power and it is no coincidence that he was drawn to a 
younger generation in the Scottish parliament who were unsullied by any association with 
the old regime. lxxxix  In England, there was a lively political debate as to what had 
changed at the Revolution and its meaning was contested.xc Not surprisingly, if there was 
confusion about what the Revolution meant in England, then there was difficulty in 
coming to terms with what it meant in Scotland. This was especially the case in that 
many of the key ministers, such as Sunderland, Marlborough and Godolphin, had all 
served under James. The ingrained cultural assumption was that Scotland should do as it 
was told. It was also shared by many Scots: the issue facing the Scots is whether they will 
be subject to the English ministry with or without trade.xci Baron John Somers, one of the 
principle Whig architects of the Union  in his History of the Kings and Queens of 
England denounced Edward III for 'the dishonour of his Kingdom and its irreparable loss, 
a peace is concluded with the Scots .. the king surrenders to the Scots, by his charter, his 
title of sovereignty to the Kingdom of Scotland ... And in consideration of all this King 
Bruce was to pay thirty thousand marks. A price too small in comparison of the value of 
what we parted with.'xcii  Clearly, Scotland should have belonged to England. Similar 
cultural assumptions were shared by some Scots. Stair referred to the English parliament 
as the Parliament of Great Britain. xciii  It was the Revolution that framed Fletcher's 
opposition to the Union and his proposals for limitations on the Crown were part and 
parcel of solidifying the transition of power from monarchy to parliament. Queen Anne, 
who already believed that the dignity of monarch was already under threat accepted 
English limitations, but separate and possibly more draconian Scottish ones were 
considered a step to far. Furthermore, as was well known, the Scots had avoided any legal 
fiction about the abdication of James VII in the Claim of Right, unlike in England where 
there was considerable back-pedalling, particularly on the right of indefeasible hereditary 
succession; Queen Anne convinced herself of the story that James VIII was an impostor 
smuggled in at birth in a bed-warming pan.  Undoubtedly, Anne's sensitivity was a major 
factor in her personal enthusiasm for Union, whatever reservations her ministers may 
have had. Furthermore, the fact that her Scottish coronation oath called upon her to 
uphold the Claim of Right simply drew attention to the divergent Scottish and English 
constitutional positions regarding the deposition of monarchy. Fletcher's proposals 
featured heavily in accounts written by English spies, most of which portrayed him as a 
republican. For English Whigs, keen to avoid being tarred with the republican brush, the 
fact that the Scottish parliament devoted a considerable amount of time on the issue of 
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limitations and Fletcher's contractual notion of monarchy was not especially welcome. A 
spat between Fletcher and Stair in August 1705 illustrates how the debate was framed 
within the context of the revolution settlement when Stair complained that ' Fletcher was 
so resolved by his limitations as the ape did by her young ones that grasped them so fast, 
till at last she stifled them'. The retort was equally stinging that Stair 'stretched the 
prerogative till it had well nigh cracked when he open the declaration for arbitrary 
power'.xciv While the debate on the meaning of the Revolution had settled down to a 
conservative consensus in England, Fletcher's proposals on limitations was bringing 
contentious issues to the surface again. As was mentioned earlier, Scottish and English 
politics did not operate in a vacuum and what went on in one kingdom would have 
ramifications in the other. It was not a debate that English politicians wanted to reopen. 
    In many ways, Stair was right because Fletcher did not believe that monarchy had 
much purpose beyond being a symbol of sovereignty. That said, all agreed that the 
monarch as a symbol of sovereignty was essential and a neglected aspect about the 
discussion surrounding the Treaty is that article two extinguished the separate Scottish 
crown. In the eyes of contemporaries the Union of 1707 was as much a legal union of the 
Crowns of Scotland and England as it was the Parliaments. Hence the protest of the duke 
of Atholl that the Union would make the crown of Scotland a dependent crown of 
England as was the case in Ireland. But for Fletcher, who the monarch was did not 
matter. It was this assertion of  radical Whig principles that has led to him being classed 
as a republican. As he noted, it did not matter whether the King was a catholic or not, the 
critical issue was that the institution of monarchy was bound by a legal framework in 
which the national interest could be protected by parliament. Given that Princes were 
determined by a biological lottery only a clearly defined constitutional and legal 
framework could, at the end of the day,  protect liberty. After all, there was no other way 
to defend against a monarch who was born bad. His promotion of the King of Prussia as a 
potential candidate for the throne of Scotland has been much derided and it has been 
claimed that it lost him much credibility. But an alternative explanation can be advanced 
in that Fletcher was trying to demonstrate that the political principles of the Revolution 
were more important than biological connection. It was a stark assertion and too stark for 
many.  
 
there was no way of  left to make the Scots a happy people, but by separating from 
England and setting up a King of their own. Not King James 8th (or rather the St 
Germaine gentleman), because he would never content himself with Scotland 
alone, unless endeavours were used to bring England under his obedience, nor 
could we be secure from those threatening inconveniences which we so happily 
escaped under his father's reign; not one of the House of Hanover, because they 
maintain consubstantiation which to him was as absurd as transubstantiation and 
therefore we ought to choose the Prince of Prussia, who was of our religion and 
able besides, by his powerful interests abroad, secure us from uneasiness from a 
jealous neighbour.xcv  
 
Although subject to ridicule then and since, at least the King of Prussia was a King, 
unlike the minor nobility of Hanover. It can also be pointed out that the Elector of 
Hanover was an absolute ruler in his own domain.xcvi However serious his intention, 
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Fletcher had a grasp of European realpolitik. Prussia was the one monarchy that could 
keep the future Hanoverian dynasty in check. As Brendan Simms has pointed out, the 
Hanoverian succession gifted the British with a vulnerable northern European outpost on 
the mainland that would drag British foreign policy into the heart of continental politics 
as it had to construct diplomatic alliances thDWZRXOGVHFXUH WKH.LQJ¶VKRPHODQGIURP
potential invasion threats.xcvii  
 
Modernity and the State 
 
In his Account of a Conversation Fletcher put forward a utopian vision of a Europe 
dominated by city states. As was noted earlier, this was in contrast to the current realities 
of Europe at the time when large powerful states were jostling for power. Although the 
Revolution had established liberty, a paradox emerged in that in order to defend that 
liberty from despotic powers, the liberal state had to become more powerful and in so 
doing, created many of the mechanisms such as standing armies, a powerful state 
bureaucracy and increased financial power, all of which were devices that could be used 
to threaten liberty and establish despotic power. It was well testified in the writings of 
Fletcher that when Prince's become too powerful, they became corrupt. But what about 
governments?  For Fletcher, the crux of the issue was that a concentration of power leads 
to corruption and his ideas of independent city states and the creation of a militia were 
mechanisms to ensure that power was dispersed and would not be concentrated in the 
hands of the court.  The trend in Britain seemed to be moving in the opposite direction 
and Fletcher's denunciation of the power of the English court and its influence on 
Scotland can be seen in the overall context of his political thought that a coalescence of 
power was a bad thing. Similarly his Whig contemporaries in England had initially feared 
an incorporating Union would enhance the power of the Court. His warning about the 
power of princes went unheeded and in spite of the Act of Settlement, the powers of 
George I and II increased to such an extent that most of the limitations imposed in 1701 
were overturned.xcviii For Fletcher, the Union would not only overturn the principles of 
the Scottish Revolution, but would it also undermine those of the English Revolution by 
giving the Court an undue influence over the northern kingdom. There is also the issue of 
the Union as a means of bringing about peace and security for both Scotland and 
England. 
     Eighteenth century Scottish politics became a by-word for corruption greased as it 
was by access to a growing reservoir of state power and patronage. Although Scottish 
political representation in Westminster was small, in a fluid political arena of shifting 
allegiances and alliances, the presence of Scottish parliamentarians was significant. At a 
time when the regular sittings in the House of Commons amounted to about three 
hundred, the Scots could make up more than ten percent of the total. The same was true 
for the House of Lords. Scottish political managers working for the Court soon caught on 
to this elementary fact of political arithmetic. The political system in Scotland became 
more closed and less open. Indeed, the Court's successful dominance of the Scottish 
political system following the Hanoverian succession in 1714 was such that Tories and 
Jacobites were completely frozen out, leading the latter to conclude that there was 
nothing to lose by a military rising.  Participation declined and the Scottish aristocracy 
were one of the few in Europe to find that its political, social and economic power was 
 Fletcher of Saltoun Lecture to The Scottish parliament 6th September 2012 
more greatly enhanced  at the end of the eighteenth century than it was at the beginning.  
      In spite of official stage-managed English celebrations, there was considerable 
disquiet in England about the Union, in particular the constitutional implications. An 
obvious point, and one to which we will return, were the consequences of allowing into 
the English political system men who had demonstrated no patriotism and who were 
widely believed to have had sold their country.  Shortly after the Union negotiations 
were concluded, an anonymous pamphlet was circulating in London that caused court 
politicians in both Scotland and England considerable embarrassment. Vulpone: Or the 
Scotch Riddle made a blistering attack on Godolphin's handling of Scottish relations and 
highlighted the various inconsistencies, twists and turns and apparent contradictions in 
dealing with the Scottish parliament. In particular, it made the case that a federal or 
confederal arrangement around the same succession and foreign policy in exchange for 
access to trade would have produced a more stable and harmonious state of affairs 
between Scotland and England. The brinkmanship of both Scottish and English 
politicians was without sense and dangerous. As things stood, it was argued, the prospect 
of an incorporating union was bleak: 
 
The peace of both nations is in danger by this consolidating Union, and it may 
perhaps deserve our enquiry, whether some of our great men here, have not had 
positive information that some of the greatest men there, that it will be impossible 
to bring that nation into the present scheme without a conquest and a standing 
army, and if that should happen to be the case, we can easily forsee what the 
consequences may one day be to England.xcix 
 
According to another near contemporary, the Scots had played a too clever game of 
brinkmanship and their bluff had EHHQ FDOOHG µLI WKH SURWHVWDQW 6XFFHVVLRQ KDG EHHQ
settled  on the foot of the Revolution Settlement in both Kingdoms, England would have 
EHHQ DV FRRO LQ WKH DIIDLU RI WKH 8QLRQ DV LW KDG DOZD\V EHHQ¶ c   A lot of English 
opposition to the Union centred on the danger to the Church of England, but the issue of 
the constitution was also brought up. The widespread perception that the Scots had been 
µERXJKW¶UDLVHGLVVXHVUHJDUGLQJWKHLULQWHJULW\LQWKHQHZ%ULWLVh House of Commons and 
/RUGVµWKHLUSHHUVEHLQJSRRUWKH\DUHOLDEOHWRWHQWDWLRQVLFRUPD\EHEURXJKWWRYRWH
RUHOHFWIRUWKRVHPRVWFDSDEOHRIJLYLQJWKHPSHQVLRQVRUSODFHV¶ci  Scottish MPs were, 
it was argued, just as dangerous to (QJODQG¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOLEHUW\ 
 
contrary to the express instructions of their electors, [Scottish parliamentarians] 
have given up their own constitution, are not likely to be more zealous for ours, but 
in all probability may be gained by the like methods to concur with any future 
Prince in forming a new scheme of government here, as they have done at home; 
DQG WKHUH¶V WKH PRUH UHDVRQ  WR VXSSRVH WKLV EHFDXVH QR &RQVWLWXWLRQ FRXOG EH
better fenced than that of Scotland, as appears by the protestations of their Country 
Party in Parliament, who refer to several laws, making it no less than high treason 
to alter or innovate the same.cii 
 
 
Undoubtedly the bad press dished out to Scottish parliamentarians at the time of the 
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Union stuck and was reinforced as the eighteenth century wore on. It reached its zenith in 
the Scotophobia surrounding the prime minister the Earl of Bute in 1763.ciii By this time, 
the reputation of Scottish MPs for corruption and venality was well established, much, it 
has to be said, as English critics of the Union claimed it would. 
      The Union did not make more secure the northern border nor the Hanoverian 
succession as was intended as the evidence of a planned invasion in 1708, and risings in 
1715 and 45 testify. As soon as news of the incorporating Union leaked out, it created 
massive instability in Scotland with mounting public discontent. Hindsight is the curse of 
the historical profession, and the story of the Union is dominated by the notion of 'all's 
well that ends well'. Yet, it nearly did not. In assessing the Union as a political strategy, it 
narrowly avoided disaster and that must be taken into account in assessing its legitimacy 
as a viable political strategy for both English and Scottish politicians to pursue.  Troops 
had to be placed on standby in case they were needed and the prospect of Union showed 
signs that it had the potential to unite Covenanters and Jacobites in common cause; a 
remarkable feat in itself. The missing piece of the equation was political leadership and 
this was something that no one could predict with certainty would not happen, especially 
given the Scottish political tendency to vacillation and opportunism. Certainly there was 
a willing populace looking to be led in opposition to the Union and Fletcher speaking of 
the mob that daily vented its discontent outside the Scottish parliament 'said it was the 
true spirit of the country, for the Reformation and Revolution were both brought about by 
them.'civ  It was a remarkable political gamble that paid off.  The confused nature of 
English attitudes towards the Union can be demonstrated by asking the simple question: 
what would have happened if there was a Scottish insurrection or rising? From a 
geo-strategic perspective, the timing could not have been worst. The war in north west 
Europe had ground to a stalemate, and although Louis had been checked, he could not be 
defeated. The Iberian Peninsular was emerging as the most important theatre of war and a 
diversion of troops to Scotland would have undoubtedly weakened this front at a time 
when the Whig war cry was 'no peace without Spain'. Yet, the Whigs were the keenest 
proponents of Union. Furthermore, Union rode roughshod over Harley and the Court's 
subsequent endeavour to hint that the issue of the Succession might be reopened to 
prevent a domestic Jacobite Rising, but their intelligence reports indicate that this was a 
most likely consequence of Union. As war weariness was beginning to bite in 1707,  it 
might be expected that a conflict on the northern border would lead to a withdrawal from 
the continental campaign to concentrate on domestic security and pursuit of a 'blue water' 
strategy, a policy favoured by anti-unionist Tories. Pro-Unionist Whigs would have 
found that with domestic security in danger, the continental strategy might rapidly lose 
support. Again, it has to be remembered that if things got too hot, as a nervous debate in 
the House of Lords indicated, the plug could be pulled.   
     Indeed, the sorry state that abounded in political circles in 1708 demonstrates the 
confused nature of English policy. Harley was attacked for the poor state of Scottish 
defences while Queen Anne used her royal veto for the one and only time to stop the 
creation of a Scottish militia on the grounds that it could not be trusted.cv The arrest of 
many Scottish politicians following the invasion scare of 1708 further added to Anglo 
Scottish tensions. As a political ideal, Union could not transcend party politics as the 
Whigs sought to place the Court under pressure during peace negotiations in 1711 to end 
WKH:DURI6SDQLVK6XFFHVVLRQ7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKH'XNHRI+DPLOWRQ¶V%ULWLVKSHHUDJH
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of Brandon brought a furious Whig onslaught in the House of Lords in which they were 
able to solicit the support of both Tories and Whigs favourable to the Court. A Whig fear 
that Scots peers ennobled into the British peerage was simply a way for the Court to 
created biddable lobby fodder for the House of Lords was their primary motivation.cvi 
7KLV ZDV HVSHFLDOO\ WKH FDVH ZKHQ LW ZDV GHPRQVWUDWHG KRZ SRZHUIXO WKH &RXUW¶V JULS
was on the election of peers in the election of 1708 when in spite of an anti-Tory 
backlash following the invasion scare, the Whigs could only secure the nomination of six 
Scottish peers. It was argued that the Union had set the Scottish representative peers at 16 
and that to increase it by promoting Scottish peers to the British peerage was a violation 
of the terms of the Union, in spite of the fact that Queensbury had such a promotion, 
though he was now dead. This won support from some of the more legalistic minds 
among the Tory Lords and Hamilton was barred for taking his seat in the Lords. 
Undoubtedly, there was an element of English chauvinism at the prospect of the dilution 
of the peerage with more Scots. For the Scottish nobility this was crassly insulting and 
led to dire warnings about the future prospects of the Union. It was especially galling for 
the Scottish aristocracy as it was heavily hinted during the Union negotiations that the 
creation of British peerages for Scots was likely.cvii That had clearly come to nought and 
+DUOH\¶VPHWKRGRIVHFXULQJWKHSDVVDJHRISHDFHQHJRWLDWLRQV  LQWKH+RXVH  RI/RUGV
was simply to create twelve new peers, none of whom were Scots and could not be 
subject to legal challenge, simply added insult to injury. Not only were Scottish interests 
under attack from the Whigs, Tories began their campaign for Episcopalian toleration in 
Scotland and secured a repeal of the Patronage Act; itself a violation of the terms of the 
Union. Paradoxically, the Tories who had most to benefit from the growth of Court 
LQIOXHQFHLQ6FRWODQGIROORZLQJWKH8QLRQDQGWKH:KLJVZKRZHUHWKH8QLRQ¶V(QJOLVK
primary architects, both thought nothing about increasing anti-Unionist sentiment in 
Scotland in pursuit of their own interests. Nothing better illustrates the contingent nature 
of English support for the Union and the overriding dominance of party interests in the 
ODVW \HDUV RI $QQHµV UHLJQ )XUWKHUPRUH ERWK WKH +DPLOWRQ FDVH DQG WKH LVVXHV RI
toleration and patronage illustrated how few friends the Scots had in Westminster. Worse 
was to following with the Malt Act in 1713 which was again widely interpreted as a 
YLRODWLRQRIWKH8QLRQ,QPDQ\ZD\VWKLVZDVWKHVWUDZWKDWEURNHWKHFDPHO¶VEDFN$
motion in the Lords against the Union was narrowly defeated by the use of four proxy 
votes as the Whigs in their determination to disrupt and embarrass the government over 
the peace treaty voted that that the Union should be disbanded so long as the succession 
was greed. Although Geoffrey Holmes has argued that this was primarily a tactical device 
used by the Whigs, a more cynical interpretation is that the political union with Scotland, 
as opposed to securing the Hanoverian succession, was not a key priority.cviii   
   Although frequently denounced as an Anglophobe, Fletcher's opposition to the Union 
was not based on anti-English sentiment but rather that it would not enhance Anglo 
Scottish cooperation and that it would open up the Scots to the same corrupting 
influences that had dogged the nation since the union of the crowns. More seriously, as 
English nationalism and its pursuit of an English national interest was becoming 
increasingly pronounced, a political surrender would not afford the Scottish national 
interest much protection. A point made by many Scottish Lords during the 1713 debate 
on whether to end the Union. cix 
     More than anything, for Fletcher, the Union was a sordid deal that brought out the 
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worst elements of corruption that he so assiduously warned against. Patronage, places, 
pensions and bribery were all there in abundance. It was a betrayal of the Revolution 
principles that formed the core of his political philosophy. Furthermore, it was a view that 
many in England shared and it raised awkward issues about the future constitutional 
integrity of the new British state, with many questioning the behaviour of the Scots, 
especially their lack of patriotism.  Scottish patriotism was not condemned in England, 
and although Fletcher was frequently represented as a republican, there was sympathy to 
the anti-Unionist position:  
 
Some who opposed the Union, did not do it out of opposition to the House of 
Hanover, but out of regard to the ancient sovereignty and independency to Scotland 
and to their constitution, the Estates in parliament. These without doubt had the 
honour and interests of their country at heart.cx 
 
Perhaps worse of all, the Union was an affront to his sense of Scottish national dignity. 
Once the Union was passed in both countries, the Whigs could not conceal their contempt 
for their Scottish allies: 
 
The Whig Lords indulge themselves mightily in vilifying the Scottish nobility for 
their part in the Union. My Lord Wharton owned in the House yesterday, that he 
doubted much he could have been prevailed upon to have parted with his birthright 
had he been a Scotch Lord and indeed, such are the times we live in that I can 
scarcely persuade anybody that some have done it out of love for country.cxi 
 
:RUVH VWLOO µ7KH :KLJ /RUGV DOO UXQ \RX GRZQ SDUWLFXODUO\ \RXU QRELOLW\ ZKR WKH\
declare, might have had better terms if they had pressed for them, and that they 
themselves and that they themselves were ashamed that they made themselves so 
FKHDS¶cxii The Earl of Rochester believed that the Scottish elected peers had divested 
themselves of their peerage and he wondered 'how the Scotch came to accept such 
unreasonable conditions or how their Lordships [English] could entertain the thought of 
permitting such peers by election to sit among them.'cxiii Although it is often said that 
Scottish unionists acted out of a sense of patriotism, it was an argument that cut no ice 
with the English at the time. Significantly, there was considerable debate as to the legality 
of the Union as it would violate the Claim of Right, which was treason in Scots law. As 
one well versed in English politics, the most hurtful aspect of the Union would be 
knowing what the English felt about it. Harley's sneer that the English had bought 
Scotland and the fact that many of the House of Lords were uneasy at admitting elected 
Scottish peers because they had sold their birth right did not auger well for Anglo 
Scottish cooperation. Similar anti Scottish sentiments following the Union were echoed 
by Marlborough and  Godolphin who concurred that the Scots had sold themselves 
cheaply and dishonourably. Indeed they had. The Equivalent was paltry compared to the 
amounts that were paid in subsidies to English allies in the War of Spanish 
Succession.cxiv What was worse, by taking on England's national debt, they would be 
paying for it themselves. When parliament met in 1707 as the first parliament of Great 
Britain, it was not a new one - calls for an election were dismissed - it was the 
continuation of the old one with some new Scottish additions. Godolphin did not even 
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prepare a proper speech. For someone like Fletcher, proud, dignified and sensitive to a 
sense of national honour, nothing could have been worse.  
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